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Cuba's Financial Situation 
By C . M . C L A R K , Acting Manager, Havana Office 
GE N E R A L post-war conditions aug-mented by the reaction from an un-
bridled speculation in sugar and an almost 
total prostration of the Port of Havana 
have brought upon Cuba its financial 
crisis. Delayed by the moratorium but 
not averted, the latest development has 
been the closing of the doors of what had 
been Cuba's most important banking in-
stitution. Much greater panic would, 
doubtless, have resulted had it not been 
for the American and Canadian banks 
with the reserves of their parent organiza-
tions behind them. 
Dating as far back as the year 1918, the 
Port of Havana has been subjected to 
serious strikes interfering with the delivery 
of goods. During the closing months of 
the war, it became extremely difficult for 
merchants in Havana to obtain any goods. 
Orders were not being filled and those 
goods which did arrive were so involved in 
the dock congestion as to be almost unob-
tainable. One of the customs regulations 
of the Port refused the clearance of a ship-
ment except in total. If part of a ship-
ment were missing, nothing could be 
cleared. Strenuous objection to this prac-
tice did finally bring about the establish-
ment of the "quedan," which is a deposit 
or guarantee covering all possible charges 
against the missing portion of the ship-
ment. Even this to-day is applicable only 
to certain classes of merchandise. 
Havana merchants placed large orders 
in the hope that some of the goods would 
get through. In some instances goods 
were ordered shipped to Matanzas to be 
brought to Havana by truck. Price meant 
little so long as the goods were to be had. 
Then there came the time when the 
overstocking of merchandise, particularly 
in the United States, was realized, and 
Cuban orders, shipment of which the mer-
chants little expected, were filled promptly. 
In the summer of 1920, the Port of H a -
vana was completely paralyzed with ship 
after ship lying at anchor waiting to dis-
charge its cargo. What little work the 
dock laborers did was handicapped by 
customs regulations. Goods were trans-
ferred to wharves and lighters until such 
capacity was exhausted. Any breakage in 
shipments in the transfer meant refusal of 
clearance. 
Millions of dollars' worth of goods were 
thus piled up in the Havana congestion 
when the storm began to break in the fall 
of 1920. Merchants who had obtained 
letters of credit at banks became power-
less to take up their shipping documents 
and banks found themselves with ship-
ments to be disposed of. Sight drafts with 
shipping documents attached were not ac-
cepted and accumulated in large numbers 
awaiting advice from shippers. 
A campaign started by the Rotary Club 
of Havana when its members donned over-
alls and went to the docks to work was 
finally successful in centering opinion upon 
the dock congestion. A commission was 
sent from the United States to assist. A 
new regime was established and merchants 
were told that they must remove their 
goods immediately upon notice. A n old 
abandoned cemetery and other vacant 
properties were obtained and enclosed, 
and non-perishable goods uncalled for by 
consignees were deposited there and stored 
under tarpaulins or such other protection 
as could be erected. 
The docks were cleared but the credit 
situation will take many months to work 
itself out. Vast quantities of merchandise 
are now on hand in Cuba bought at tre-
mendously high prices and surcharged with 
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excessive handling costs. Necessarily much 
of this must be sold in a market where 
falling prices appear to be the prospect. 
Rice importers and dry-goods merchants 
have extremely aggravated situations to 
deal with. 
That part of the banking business which 
centers upon the commodity credit has 
been severely strained. The financial out-
look of the merchants themselves is not a 
favorable one. They have maintained 
their high prices, believing that a refusal 
to import new goods would compel the 
people to buy those on hand at old prices. 
The anticipated sales have not been made 
and the merchants are facing the prospect 
of competition with goods purchased in 
the readjusted markets of the rest of the 
world. In some cases they are now turn-
ing to their creditors in the United States 
and Europe to share their losses with them 
by a cancellation of part of their debts, ex-
plaining that more wil l be received in that 
way than i f the Cuban house is forced to 
suspend payment of liabilities, which is a 
Cuban procedure in insolvency. 
Another factor having its effect upon the 
merchandise credit, although only to a 
limited extent, is the Cuban insurance 
company. Not required by law to main-
tain reserves to cover liabilities to policy-
holders, any such action has been volun-
tary. Rumors are therefore easy of cir-
culation and only a complete investigation 
of some of the companies attacked could 
establish their solvency. Perhaps the pres-
ent situation wil l cause the enactment of 
adequate insurance laws and provide for 
their enforcement. A t present most of 
the marine and fire risks are carried by 
foreign companies. 
With all the difficulties of trading, the 
uncertain value of merchandise credits, 
and the question of shipping documents as 
security, the failure of the Banco Nacional 
de Cuba might not have occurred had it 
not been for the wild speculation in sugar. 
There are those who pay to the former 
president of the Banco Nacional the honor 
of saying that had he not been absent be-
cause of critical illness in his family he 
could have held the situation in check. 
Normally selling at from 3 ¼ to 4 cents 
per pound, sugar was forced up until the 
price of 2 3 ½ cents was reached in June, 
1920. Belief was common among some 
that the price would go to 30 cents or 
higher. Vast loans were obtained from 
the banks for purchase of sugar properties 
and the growing of cane, for the purchase 
and development of mills, for the financing 
of expenditures incident to delivery and 
sale of sugar. In addition to the loans for 
development, there was the speculation in 
sugar itself. 
In recalling this sugar bubble that grew 
and burst, one must remember that the 
instincts of chance are much more general 
among the Latin-Americans and whetted 
just a little bit more keenly than the pres-
ent day Anglo-Saxon community contem-
plates. Like some other governments Cuba 
conducts every ten days a national lottery 
and every Cuban has his expectation that 
he is going to win one of the big prizes on 
some chance he takes. Cuba also permits 
the operation of a public roulette wheel. 
The bankers had an exceptional oppor-
tunity while it lasted. Interest rates 
mounted higher and higher. Time loans 
up into the millions were negotiated at 13 
per cent. compounded monthly. As the 
price of sugar advanced, loans were in-
creased accordingly. Lacking laws regu-
lating reserve funds, stockholders' liabil-
ity, or even stockholders' contribution of 
cash, there was a great temptation for 
banks to take long chances and to make 
big loans where interest returns were large. 
But the price of sugar, reaching its crest 
in June, 1920, began to fall. The high in-
itial price and the effect of the rate of for-
eign exchange produced a fabulous price 
for sugar in Europe and that market be-
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came practically closed. Banks with sugar 
hypothecations called upon their borrowers 
to cover wherever possible. Where noth-
ing else could be obtained, the banks had 
to be satisfied with the pledge of future 
crops contained in their contracts of hy-
pothecation. The price continued to fall 
and has now reached 4 1/8 cents. 
The crash with the banks came on Oc-
tober 8, 1920, when a large check was pre-
sented to the Banco Internacional, which 
acknowledged its inability to pay and sus-
pended payment. The following morning 
there were runs on the Banco Español de 
la Isla de Cuba and the Banco Nacional de 
Cuba. The short business day of Saturday 
was in the favor of the banks, and on Sun-
day, October 10, President Menocal de-
clared a moratorium under which the 
banks need pay immediately only 10 per 
cent. of their liability to depositors. 
For a day or two some banks did not 
observe the moratorium. Then an agree-
ment was worked out by the banks to 
stand together and not allow the with-
drawal of funds beyond the ten per cent. 
l imit. Deposits made after the mora-
torium were subject to withdrawal in full 
at any time. 
E l Banco Internacional and E l Banco 
Español de la Isla de Cuba came forward 
with offers to their depositors of managers' 
certificates or bonds covering the amounts 
of their deposits. Some depositors, be-
lieving that they would obtain more by 
accepting the certificates and allowing the 
banks to continue, did so. The success of 
such a scheme wil l depend upon a suffi-
cient number of depositors accepting the 
certificates to relieve the immediate em-
barrassment of the situation, and then the 
obtaining of sufficient new deposits and 
new business to relieve the top-heavy cap-
ital condition created by the interest-
bearing certificates. 
A proposal strongly urged by many was 
that the Banco Nacional be authorized to 
issue paper money and thus supply the 
currency necessary for the liquidation of 
the moratorium liabilities. Another plan 
was for the establishment of a clearing 
house with power to issue certificates which 
should pass as currency. It was with great 
difficulty that the issue of fiat money was 
avoided. Even now it is constantly sug-
gested. 
Just before the expiration of the mora-
torium, a law was passed known as the 
Torriente Law, providing for the liquida-
tion of moratorium debts. Taking effect 
January 27, 1921, it provided that com-
mercial debts should be paid 15 per cent. 
within 15 days, 25 per cent. within 45 days, 
25 per cent. within 75 days, and the 
remainder, or 35 per cent., within 105 days. 
Bank balances as of the date of the mora-
torium were subject to withdrawal 15 per 
cent. in 15 days, 15 per cent. in 45 days, 
20 per cent. in 75 days, 25 per cent. in 105 
days, and 25 per cent. in 135 days. 
The hope behind the Torriente Law was 
that the sales of the current crop of sugar 
would produce funds for the gradual liqui-
dation of the moratorium obligations. A 
disquieting feature, however, was the pres-
ence in Cuba of large amounts of the previ-
ous crop still on hand. General estimates 
were made that the whole current crop 
would have to be sold at from five to six 
cents to provide any possibility of liqui-
dation. Subsequent estimates have set 
the figure necessary to clear the situation 
as low as 4 ¼ cents. 
(To be concluded) 
We note with pleasure that M r . E . A . 
Kracke, Manager of the Chicago Office, 
has recently obtained the C. P . A . certifi-
cate of Illinois; also that M r . T . U . Conner, 
of the Atlanta Office, has obtained the 
C. P. A . certificate of the State of New 
York. 
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Cuba's Financial Situation—(Concluded) 
By C . M . C L A R K , Acting Manager, Havana Office 
A S U G A R B O A R D was created to maintain the price of sugar and con-
trol sales. The most powerful means 
which the Board could have had to con-
trol the situation, it did not possess, 
namely, the ability to finance the mills 
and the crop. The price has been main-
tained to a certain extent but sales have 
been limited. Considerable activity was 
evidenced during the latter part of Apr i l 
in transferring sugar to the United States 
in order to have it landed there before the 
Fordney tariff provisions should become 
effective, but such transfers were not neces-
sarily sales. 
Little difficulty was experienced by the 
banks in February. The Torriente Law 
required only a payment of 15 per cent. of 
moratorium balances and 10 per cent. had 
already been paid. The middle of March 
was passed without trouble although the 
pinch for money was beginning to be felt. 
The planters needed money, the mills 
needed money, in fact throughout the in-
terior of the island it was difficult, almost 
impossible, to get money. 
On behalf of the Banco Nacional, a com-
mission was sent to the United States to 
secure the necessary funds for the middle 
of Apr i l moratorium payment. On Apr i l 
9 the bank announced its inability to se-
cure the necessary funds and did not open 
its doors for business. 
Acting in good faith with the post mora-
torium depositors, the bank issued to them 
drafts on the Royal Bank of Canada for 
their balances. Its affairs were then turned 
over to a liquidating commission. 
Directly following the closing of the 
Banco Nacional vehement attacks were 
made upon the American and Canadian 
banks, particularly upon the Royal Bank 
of Canada. The consequent run upon that 
bank was met only by telegraphic instruc-
tions to remain open until midnight if 
necessary to pay depositors. Rumor that 
the foreign banks would not stand behind 
their Cuban branches was thus success-
fully met. 
During the week of Apr i l 11, a loan, said 
to be $20,000,000, was obtained by a 
combination of financial interests, and a 
corporation was formed to finance the mills 
and the sugar crop. This organization has 
been credited with the ability to raise 
whatever funds are necessary for its pur-
poses. It is backed by the interests of the 
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 
the Royal Bank of Canada, and The N a -
tional City Bank of New York . 
The situation as this article is written 
has eased considerably but the next strain 
wil l probably occur as the date for the mid-
dle of May moratorium payment ap-
proaches. The political situation has been 
cleared by the recognition by the United 
States of Dr . Alfredo Zayas as the duly 
elected President of Cuba to take office on 
M a y 20, 1921, and by the withdrawal of 
General Jose Miguel Gomez from the 
political field. 
There is a great deal of hoarding of 
money. Importation and sale of small 
family safes is extensive. A practice which 
dates back to the time when merchants 
throughout the island had more confidence 
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in the people who sold them merchandise 
than in the banks shows evidence of being 
revived. Deposits with the merchants of 
Havana are being made by their custom-
ers, to be disposed of in accordance with 
instructions. Such deposits, however, can-
not bear interest or else the Havana mer-
chant would subject himself to the bank-
er's tax. How long these practices wil l 
continue, and whether there wil l be the 
burglaries that usually ensue, only time 
will tell. 
For a clear understanding of the effect 
upon the Island of Cuba of the closing of 
the Banco Nacional, it must be mentioned 
that this bank with its principal office in 
Havana, maintained 135 branches through-
out the island. E l Banco Español de la 
Isla de Cuba with its principal office in 
Havana also operates many branches. 
Confidence between the American and 
Canadian banks on the one hand and the 
people of Cuba on the other is a little too 
far strained to permit a ready solution of 
the problem by American financing. The 
newspapers of Cuba have little understood 
that a policy of conservatism on their part 
would do much to help the situation. 
They have made bitter attacks upon the 
banks with no regard for the effect of such 
articles in destroying confidence. The 
foreign banks are a little hesitant about 
taking deposits that will be withdrawn at 
the next rumor. And their loans are 
greatly hampered by the Cuban custom 
which is to loan largely on name and 
persuasion. 
Financial statements are not usually 
offered, but wil l be supplied from the books 
when requested. Such statements are not 
to be questioned without apparent insult 
to the client. They must be assumed to 
be correct because the Cuban law places 
certain restrictions upon the keeping of 
books. To doubt the correctness of ac-
counts is to question the integrity of the 
organization and the honesty of the book-
keeper, according to the Cuban attitude. 
That the bookkeeper may have uninten-
tionally made some mistakes or that he 
may not have thoroughly understood the 
accounting principles necessary to record 
in a proper way some transactions, is given 
no consideration. 
One of the outstanding examples of 
credit is revealed in the announcement in 
the newspapers of the meeting of the cred-
itors of one individual who owes $28,000,-
000, and whose pyramid of debt was 
built for the purchase of property at highly 
inflated values with no margin of safety. 
Liquidation of such liabilities, if possible 
at all, cannot be accomplished for years. 
While the assets include two sugar cen-
trals, a refinery, some land, securities and 
contracts, it is difficult to see how these 
can keep up the interest on such heavy 
loans and make any substantial reduction 
of principal. 
The situation now is one of anxious hope. 
The mills are grinding and there is evi-
dence of activity which ought to produce 
some value for purposes of liquidation. 
Rumors constantly come to Havana that 
certain large mills have closed for want of 
funds. But as yet these remain uncon-
firmed. The end of the grinding season 
will , without doubt, find many heavy 
credits not liquidated. A system of Amer-
ican warehouses has been established and 
is being extended to take care of some of 
the sugar that is not sold. 
Cuba may reach a situation this summer 
or fall where it will have to face large cred-
its unliquidated by the present crop and 
with little prospect of further extensive 
liquidation until the grinding season of 
1922. This is not necessarily pessimistic 
prophecy. It is an eventuality to be con-
sidered as a part of the financial outlook. 
There is little doubt but that many in 
Cuba have learned from bitter experience 
that certainty should be the foundation of 
banking and finance in so far as certainty 
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is possible. And where estimates of the 
future must be made, such estimate should 
be based upon known facts as to present 
conditions, and as to the results of past 
efforts. 
For some the lesson wil l not have been 
sufficiently plain and the old "rule of 
thumb" methods will continue. That per-
sons wil l be able to build credits into the 
millions of dollars without presenting cer-
tified statements, however, is hardly to be 
looked for again. Such credits wil l be es-
tablished not upon one's estimate of what 
he has, nor upon a certification of what 
his books say, but upon impartial com-
petent opinion expressed after careful in-
vestigation, and substantiated by figures 
verified and presented. 
